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A Bayesian Solution to the Conflict of Narrowness
and Precision in Direct Inference
Christian Wallmann1
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Abstract The conflict of narrowness and precision in direct inference occurs if a body of
evidence contains estimates for frequencies in a certain reference class and less precise
estimates for frequencies in a narrower reference class. To develop a solution to this
conflict, I draw on ideas developed by Paul Thorn and John Pollock. First, I argue that
Kyburg and Teng’s solution to the conflict of narrowness and precision leads to unrea-
sonable direct inference probabilities. I then show that Thorn’s recent solution to the
conflict leads to unreasonable direct inference probabilities. Based on my analysis of
Thorn’s approach, I propose a natural distribution for a Bayesian analysis of the data
directly obtained from studying members of the narrowest reference class.
Keywords Reference class problem  Direct inference  Statistical syllogism  Imprecise
probabilities  Expected frequency  Specificity  Natural distribution
1 Introduction
In direct inference, the probability that a certain individual belongs to a target class is
equated with the relative frequency of the target class in a suitable reference class (Venn
1888; Reichenbach 1949; Pollock 1990; Kyburg 1961). For instance, from the premises
that (1) Roland is male Austrian and that (2) 27.3% of male Austrians smoke, it follows by
direct inference that Roland smokes with probability 0.273. Knowledge of frequencies in
narrower reference classes to which the individual belongs defeats the above direct
inference. If we add the premises that (3) Roland is 32 years old and that (4) 35.7% of male
Austrians aged 32 smoke, then it follows by direct inference that Roland smokes with
probability 0.357. The single-case probability here is the rational degree of belief or the
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rational credence of an agent that entertains the relevant body of evidence. In what follows,
I will call it direct inference probability. The direct inference probability expresses the
agent’s lack of knowledge and uncertainty regarding Roland’s smoking status. It is not a
physical probability, i.e., it does not express objective randomness in the world. For the
sake of brevity, I often will not mention ‘target class’ or ‘frequency’ explicitly. For
instance, instead of speaking of ‘the estimate for the frequency of the target class in the
narrower reference class’, I will be speaking of the ‘estimate for the narrower reference
class’.
As pointed out by numerous authors, striving for narrow reference class and striving for
precise estimates of frequencies in reference classes are competing aims (Venn 1888;
Reichenbach 1949; Kyburg and Teng 2001). Narrower reference classes should be pre-
ferred in direct inference, because frequencies of the target class in narrower reference
classes are more relevant to the direct inference probability. However, narrower reference
classes have less members. Hence, it is harder to take a sufficiently large sample of
individuals that belong to a narrow reference class. As a result statistical estimates for
frequencies of the target class in a narrow reference class are often less precise. As the
pioneer of reference class reasoning John Venn puts it
[...]; but whilst cautioning us against appealing to too wide a class, it seems to
suggest that we cannot go wrong in the opposite direction, that is in taking too
narrow a class. And yet we do avoid any such extremes. John Smith is not only an
Englishman; he may also be a native of such a part of England, be living in such a
Presidency, and so on. An indefinite number of such additional characteristics might
be brought out into notice, many of which at any rate have some bearing upon the
question of vitality. Why do we reject any consideration of these narrower classes?
We do reject them, but it is for what may be termed a practical rather than a
theoretical reason. Now many of the attributes of any individual are so rare that to
take them into account would be at variance with the fundamental assumption of our
science, viz. that we properly concerned only with averages of large numbers (Venn
1888, p. 220).
Simply rejecting these narrower reference classes is a luxury we often cannot afford. In
personalized medicine, for instance, the narrowest reference class for which reliable
statistics can be compiled is often not narrow enough. Probabilistic relationships between
the narrowest reference class for which reliable statistics can be compiled and the target
class are often not strong enough to be useful for medical diagnosis and prediction
(Manolio et al. 2009; Salari et al. 2012).
Hence, often a body of evidence contains estimates for frequencies in a certain reference
class and less precise estimates for frequencies in a narrower reference class. In this case I
say that a conflict of narrowness and precision obtains. To provide the rational degree of
belief in face of a conflict of narrowness and precision amounts to solving it. What should
our degree of belief that Roland smokes be if our body of evidence, for instance, contains
in addition to (1) Roland is male Austrian and Roland is 32 years old and (2) 27.3% of
male Austrians smoke, also that (3) the frequency of 32 year old male Austrians that smoke
is between 20 and 50%?
To develop a new solution to the conflict of precision and narrowness, I draw on ideas
developed by Paul Thorn and John Pollock. To determine direct inference probabilities,
Thorn (2012, 2016) and Pollock (1990, 2011) consider arbitrary subsets of the broader
reference class. I show that Thorn’s approach leads to unreasonable direct inference
probabilities and propose a remedy.
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The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2, I present Kyburg and Teng’s approach to
direct inference. I argue that it leads to unreasonable direct inference probabilities. In
Sect. 3, I present Thorn’s and Pollock’s approaches to direct inference. I then show that
Thorn’s solution to the conflict of narrowness and precision leads to unreasonable direct
inference probabilities. I also analyse the causes for the failure of Thorn’s solution. In
Sect. 4, I propose a new Bayesian solution to the conflict of precision and narrowness that
employs a natural prior.
2 Kyburg and Teng’s Approach to Direct Inference
In this section, I present Kyburg and Teng’s solution to the conflict of narrowness and
precision. I argue that the resulting direct inference probabilities are often unreasonable.
Instead of only considering the case of point-valued information, Kyburg and Teng also
consider interval-valued information about frequencies in reference classes. Let T be a
target class, R;R0;R1; . . .;R5 be reference classes, and c an individual. Suppose that
freqðT jRÞ 2 ½x; y states that the relative frequency of individuals in R that are also T lies in
the interval [x, y]. Finally, assume that PROB(A) is the rational degree of belief that the
proposition A is true. Following Kyburg and Teng, I call two intervals [x, y] and [u, v]
conflicting if and only if neither one is a subset of the other, i.e., if and only if ½x; y 6 ½u; v
and ½u; v 6 ½x; y. Kyburg and Teng (2001) propose the following reference class rules.
Criterion of Precision Suppose that [x, y] and [u, v] and ½x; y  ½u; v are not
conflicting and that R0  R. If freqðT jRÞ ¼ ½x; y and freqðT jR0Þ ¼ ½u; v, then
PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½x; y.
Criterion of Specificity Suppose that [x, y] and [u, v] are conflicting and that
R0  R. If freqðT jRÞ ¼ ½x; y and freqðT jR0Þ ¼ ½u; v, then PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½u; v.
Combination of competing reference classes Suppose that R1 6 R2 and R2 6 R1. If
freqðT jR1Þ ¼ ½x; y and freqðTjR2Þ ¼ ½u; v, then PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½minfx; ug;
maxfy; vg.
The Criterion of Precision requires that in the case of non-conflicting intervals the more
precise interval should be preferred. For instance, if R0  R, freqðTjRÞ ¼ ½0:3; 0:5,
freqðT jR0Þ 2 ½0:25; 0:7, and c 2 R0, then PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½0:3; 0:5. The Criterion of
Specificity states that in the case of two conflicting intervals the narrower reference class
should be preferred. For instance, if R0  R , freqðTjRÞ ¼ ½0:4; 0:6, freqðT jR0Þ 2 ½0:5; 0:8,
and c 2 R0, then PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½0:5; 0:8. The combination rule demands that PROBðc 2
TÞ is located in the convex hull of the intervals for the competing reference classes. For
instance, if freqðT jR1Þ ¼ ½0:3; 0:5, freqðT jR2Þ ¼ ½0:4; 0:7, c 2 R1 and c 2 R2, then
PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½0:3; 0:7.
If a body of evidence contains information for many different reference classes, the
criteria of specificity and precision may interact. For such complex direct inference sce-
narios Kyburg and Teng (2001) suggest to sharpen the body of evidence before drawing
any direct inference. They propose the following procedure to sharpen a body of evidence.
In a first step, they apply the Criterion of Specificity to the whole body of evidence. This
step rules out all intervals that are conflicting with the interval for the most specific
reference class. In a second step, they apply the Criterion of Specificity to the second most
specific reference class in the remaining set. They iterate this procedure until for any two
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remaining reference classes R0  R the intervals are not conflicting. Application of the
Criterion of Precision yields the tightest of these intervals. Finally, they apply the com-
bination rule to the remaining competing reference classes. The following example illus-
trates this procedure. Suppose that c belongs to the reference classes R1;R2;R3;R4;R5. Our
body of evidence contains the following information about frequencies in those reference
classes.
freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3 ^ R4 ^ R5Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:8
freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3 ^ R4Þ ¼ ½0:19; 0:6
freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3Þ ¼ ½0:4; 0:8
freqðT jR1 ^ R2Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:3
freqðT jR1Þ ¼ ½0:21; 0:22
First, freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3 ^ R4 ^ R5Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:8 rules out freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3 ^
R4Þ ¼ ½0:19; 0:6 by specificity. Second, freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3Þ ¼ ½0:4; 0:8 rules out
freqðT jR1 ^ R2Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:3 and freqðT jR1Þ ¼ ½0:21; 0:22 by specificity in the remaining
set. The remaining set ffreqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3 ^ R4 ^ R5Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:8; freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^
R3Þ ¼ ½0:4; 0:8g consists of two non-conflicting intervals. freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3 ^ R4 ^
R5Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:8 is ruled out by precision. Hence, PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½0:4; 0:8. I now argue
that Kyburg and Teng’s approach leads to unreasonable direct inference probabilities. First,
their overemphasis on the fact that two intervals conflict leads to unstable inference.
Minimal changes in reference class probabilities may lead to huge changes in the direct
inference probability. Consider, for instance, the reference class information freqðT jR0Þ ¼
½0:2; 0:6 and freqðTjRÞ ¼ 0:2. The Criterion of Precision leads to PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ 0:2.
Consider now the small change from freqðT jRÞ ¼ 0:2 to freqðT jRÞ ¼ 0:19. The Criterion
of Specificity yields PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½0:2; 0:6 rather than PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ 0:2. This
instability carries over to more complex bodies of evidence. If, for instance, in the above
example freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3 ^ R4Þ ¼ ½0:19; 0:6 is replaced by freqðT jR1 ^ R2^
R3 ^ R4Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:6, then PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½0:21; 0:22.
1
Second, Kyburg and Teng treat all values in the interval of all possible frequencies
equally. However, in practice, these values are estimated from a sample. Values within the
center of those intervals maximize the likelihood of the observed sample. To determine the
direct inference probability, positions of points within the interval should therefore be
taken into account (see also Sect. 4.2). In the above example, if obtained by a sample, the
maximum likelihood estimate for freqðT jR0Þ lies in most cases in the center of the interval
[0.2, 0.6]. Hence, the sample of the narrower reference class provides evidence against the
value freqðTjR0Þ ¼ 0:2. Hence, it is unreasonable to extrapolate the frequency 0.2 from the
broader reference class to the narrower reference class. As a consequence, Kyburg and
Teng’s approach may lead to irrational decisions (Stone 1987, pp. 253–254). Stone con-
siders the case in which the Ace Urn Company places balls ordered into urns. We get the
following information.
1. The Ace Urn Company orders a proportion of .51 red balls;
2. The proportion of red balls ordered by the Taiwan Division is somewhere in [.01, .52].
1 In this case, freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3 ^ R4Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:6 remains in the body of evidence after carrying out step
1. In a second step, freqðT jR1 ^ R2 ^ R3Þ ¼ ½0:4; 0:8 is removed from the body of evidence. Therefore,
freqðT jR1 ^ R2Þ ¼ ½0:2; 0:3 and freqðT jR1Þ ¼ ½0:21; 0:22 remain in the body of evidence. Applying pre-
cision, we obtain PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ ½0:21; 0:22.
C. Wallmann
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An agent draws a ball from an urn which is labeled by ‘‘Ace Urn Company-Made in
Taiwan’’. What is the probability that the agent will draw a red ball? Kyburg and Teng’s
approach leads to the direct inference probability 0.51. Suppose a brilliant chef offers us a
very delicious meal, if either (1) we guess the correct color of the ball or (2) we roll a fair
die and it comes up 6. We have the choice. I agree with Stone that we should choose the
first option and guess ‘‘black’’. Kyburg and Teng, however, recommend ‘‘red’’.
3 Subset Approaches
For determining direct inference probabilities, Pollock (2011) and Thorn (2016) consider
arbitrary subsets of the broader reference class. In this section, I present Thorn’s solution to
the conflict of narrowness and precision. I show that and why it leads to unreasonable
direct inference probabilities. Finally, I argue that Pollock’s approach to direct inference
encounters the very same problems.
3.1 Thorn’s Epistemic Utility Argument
Thorn (2016) gives the following epistemic utility argument for equating the direct
inference probability with the expected frequency in the narrowest reference class. Denote
by ‘Sc’ the conjunction of all properties that the individual c is known to have. Suppose
that we assign to all individuals d1; . . .; dn with the properties Sc the same direct inference
probability Probðdi 2 TÞ ¼ vi ¼ v. Thorn calls such a policy principled. Let Vðdi 2 TÞ 2
f0; 1g be the truth value of the proposition di 2 T . Assume that we measure epistemic






ðv Vðdi 2 TÞÞ
2
:
Then S is minimised if and only if v ¼ freqðT jScÞ. Hence, setting the direct inference
probability to the frequency in the narrowest reference class maximises epistemic accuracy
in the class Sc. Thorn (2016) shows that this result holds for a much more general class of
accuracy measures (so-called proper scoring rules).
Often, however, freqðT jScÞ will be unknown. In these cases, the expected value of
freqðT jScÞ maximises expected accuracy in the class Sc (Thorn 2016). Thorn calls the
expected value of freqðT jScÞ expected frequency. Following Thorn, we denote it by
‘E½freqðT jScÞ’. For this reason he entertains the following direct inference rule:
If R0 is the narrowest reference class the individual c is known to belong to and
E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ r, then PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ r.2
This concludes the presentation of Thorn’s argument. Thorn (2016) himself identifies and
discusses four non-trivial assumptions in his argument. First, the expected frequency in the
narrowest reference class minimises expected inaccuracy only if accuracy is measured by




i¼1 jv Vðdi 2 TÞj, then the expected frequency in the narrowest reference class
2 Note that Thorn’s argument does not justify the following version of the principle of the narrowest
reference class: If we know that Dc;Bc;Cc; freqðT jBÞ ¼ r; freqðT jB ^ CÞ ¼ s, then PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ s. The
additional assumption E½freqðAjB ^ C ^ DÞ ¼ s is needed.
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does not minimise S0. Second, the expected frequency in the narrowest reference class
minimises expected inaccuracy only if we make predictions about all individuals with Sc.
Third, expected accuracy is relative to the distribution employed to calculate the expected
accuracy. Maximising expected accuracy is only a legitimate aim if the distribution is
empirically accurate, i.e., if it matches the relative frequencies in the world. Fourth, even if
the distribution employed to calculate the expected frequency is accurate, one needs to care
about expected accuracy.
Thorn’s assumptions are by no means uncontroversial. Below, I discuss ways in which
they may fail. For Thorn’s second assumption, two alternatives seem to be at least equally
plausible. We could aim to make the best decision for the single-case c 2 T or we may
require maximum accuracy in the class of all individuals for which predictions are being
made. In both cases setting PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ freqðT jScÞ does not maximise accuracy.
Regarding the third assumption I show in Sect. 4.1 that Thorn’s distribution to determine
the expected value and expected accuracy is inaccurate. Finally, clearly, expected accuracy
is of main importance in the long-run—but should it be of importance in the short-run?
Opinions are divided here. On the one hand, Pollock claims that many single-cases add up
to a long-run. For this reason, they should not receive special treatment.
People sometimes protest at this point that they are not interested in the general case.
They are concerned with some inference they are only going to make once. They
want to know why they should reason this way in the single case. But all cases are
single cases. If you reason in this way in single cases, you will tend to get them right
(Pollock 2011, p. 32).
On the other hand, Williamson does not require that direct inference probabilities
maximise expected accuracy. His direct inference probabilities should minimise worst-case
expected loss (Williamson 2013). Minimising worst-case loss is a cautious strategy.3
A detailed discussion of Thorn’s assumptions goes beyond the scope of the present
paper. In what follows I mainly show that Thorn’s third assumption is violated. His
distribution employed to calculate expected accuracy is inaccurate. Hence, maximising
accuracy relative to Thorn’s distribution is the wrong thing to do.
3.2 Thorn’s Solution to the Conflict of Narrowness and Precision
Consider now the conflict of narrowness and precision. Assume that c belongs to two
reference classes R0  R. Suppose that 1) we have precise-valued information freqðT jRÞ ¼
x for the frequency in the broader reference class and that 2) we have imprecise-valued
information freqðT jR0Þ ¼ v1 _ . . . _ freqðT jR
0Þ ¼ vn for the frequency in the narrower
reference class. According to Thorn’s approach (see Sect. 3.1), PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼
3 In the following example, minimising worst-case loss and maximising accuracy lead to different direct
inference probabilities. Suppose, for instance, that we only know that c belongs to the reference class E.
Suppose further that a statistical trial yields the maximum likelihood estimate m for freq(T|E), i.e., setting
m ¼ freqðT jEÞ maximises the probability of the observed outcome of the trial. Williamson recommends to
calibrate PROBðc 2 TÞ only to a certain extent with the maximum likelihood estimate m. Suppose that
½m a;mþ a is a x%-confidence interval for freq(T|E), where x is the confidence level at which the agent
grants that freqðT jEÞ 2 ½m a;mþ a. If the agent grants that freqðAjEÞ 2 ½m a;mþ a, Williamson’s
calibration norm locates PROBðc 2 TÞ in the interval ½m a;mþ a. Williamson’s equivocation norm
selects the most cautious value in ½m a;mþ a, i.e., whichever is the closest to 0.5, for PROBðc 2 TÞ. If
confidence intervals are wide and estimates are less precise, then Williamson’s direct inferences may differ
considerably from the maximum likelihood estimate m. For instance, if m ¼ 0:25 and a 95%-confidence
interval is [0.1, 0.4], then Williamson’s approach leads to PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ 0:4.
C. Wallmann
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E½freqðT jR0Þ. To determine the direct inference probability we therefore need to calculate
the expected frequency E½freqðT jR0Þ. Thorn proposes the following method to do this.
In what follows we set V ¼ fv1; . . .; vng so that freqðTjR
0Þ ¼ v1 _ . . . _ freqðT jR
0Þ ¼ vn
becomes freqðT jR0Þ 2 V . According to Thorn’s Method 1, E½freqðT jR0Þ is a weighted
average of the values in V (Thorn 2016). The weights are the probabilities that freqðT jR0Þ
has value vi, i.e., PROBðfreqðT jR
0Þ ¼ viÞ. Thorn proposes to determine these probabilities
by drawing direct inferences for the reference class R0. Since this strategy treats reference
classes as individuals and subsumes them under other reference classes, I call the resulting
direct inferences meta direct inferences.
According to Thorn, the most appropriate (meta) reference class for R0 in this case is the
set of all subsets of R that have the same size as R0 and whose relative frequency of the
target class is among the values in V. Hence, PROBðfreqðT jR0Þ ¼ viÞ ¼ freqðfS :
freqðT jSÞ ¼ vigjfS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR






zi ¼ freqðfS : freqðTjSÞ ¼ vigjfS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR
0jgÞ: ð1Þ
Means to calculating the zi are well-known in finite combinatorics. In fact, the zi are
hypergeometrically distributed (see ‘‘Appendix’’ section Equation (5)). We will come back
to this in Sect. 3.4. Thorn’s reasoning can be summarized by the following two steps.
Step 1: Meta direct inference to determine the weights
Premise 1:
pi ¼ freqðfS : freqðTjSÞ ¼ vigjfS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR
0j ^ freqðT jSÞ 2 VÞgÞ
Premise 2: R0 2 fS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR0j ^ freqðT jSÞ 2 Vg
Conclusion: PROBðfreqðT jR0Þ ¼ viÞ ¼ pi





0Þ ¼ viÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
vi  pi: ð2Þ
The method generalizes then to the case jR0j 2 W where W is an arbitrary set (see Thorn
2016, Theorem 5).
To calculate PROBðfreqðTjR0Þ ¼ viÞ by the above meta direct inference is initially
plausible. If the frequency of smokers in Austria is 30% and Roland is Austrian, then the
probability that Roland smokes is 0.3. Analogously, if the frequency of subsets S of R such
that freqðT jSÞ ¼ vi is pi and if R
0 is a subset of R, then the probability that freqðT jR0Þ ¼ vi
is pi. As long as no better (meta) reference class for R
0 can be found, conclusions drawn by
Thorn’s approach remain plausible. In Sect. 4.1, I show that a better reference class can be
found.
Thorn illustrates Method 1 by means of the following example:
Example 1 Suppose Bill is a member of Company B. Company B has 100 members and
25 members are NCOs. Suppose also that Bill is a member of the command unit of
Company B. The command unit has 10 members. Either 20% of the command unit are
NCOs or 30% are NCOs. What is the probability that Bill is an NCO?
A Bayesian Solution to the Conflict of Narrowness and...
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The example can be formalised this way: jRj ¼ 100, freqðT jRÞ ¼ 0:25, jR0j ¼ 10 and
freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:3. Following his Method 1, Thorn derives that the
probability that Bill is NCO PROBðc 2 TÞ is 0.2485.4
As Thorn correctly claims, this result does not depend much on the size of Company B.
In addition, as we will shortly see, if jR0j is sufficiently large, E½freqðT jR0Þ does not depend
much on the size of the command unit either.
3.3 Counter-Examples to Thorn’s Method
In this section, I give some numerical examples in which Thorn’s Method 1 leads to
unreasonable direct inference probabilities.5 These examples show that the weights pi are
too extreme to serve as basis for direct inference.
First, Thorn’s Method 1 is not monotonic in the following sense. Suppose that
freqðT jRÞ ¼ 0:25. If we compare freqðT jR0Þ ¼ s _ freqðTjR0Þ ¼ t with freqðT jR0Þ ¼
s _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ t0, where t\t0, the later may result in a lower value for E½freqðT jR0Þ. In
Thorn’s example, with freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:4, we obtain E½freqðTjR0Þ ¼
0:266, with freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:5, we obtain E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:246, and
finally with freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:6, we obtain E½freqðTjR0Þ ¼ 0:216.
Second, assume that the possible frequencies for the narrower reference class span an
interval that contains the frequency of the broader reference class. In this case Method 1,
assigns most of the weight to the frequency closest to the frequency of the broader ref-
erence class. If freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:7, we obtain E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:203. The








¼ 155:9282297, i.e., w1 is almost 156
times as high as w2.
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Third, assume that the possible values for the narrower reference class span an interval
that contains the frequency of the broader reference class, that |R| and jR0j are sufficiently
high, and that freq(T|R) is a possible value for freqðTjR0Þ.7 In this case the information
about the narrower reference class is ignored by Method 1. In other words: Thorn’s
approach leads to Kyburg’s Criterion of Precision (see Sect. 2). We have seen that the
Criterion of Precision is flawed. For instance, if jRj ¼ 1000 and jR0j ¼ 100, and
freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:21. . . _ freqðTjR0Þ ¼ 0:39 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:4, then
E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:257. This value will not change if we replace the endpoint of the interval
by any value in the set f0:41; 0:42; . . .; 1g. Furthermore, this value will not change much if
we vary jR0j. If jR0j 2 ½100; 900, then the minimum of the corresponding expected fre-
quencies is 0.249 and the maximum is 0.259. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
E½freqðT jR0Þ 2 ½0:249; 0:259.
Fourth, and related, consider the case in which the possible values for the narrower
reference class span an interval that does not contain the value of the broader reference
4 Step 1: freqðfS : freqðT jSÞ ¼ 0:2gjfS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ 10 ^ ðfreqðT jSÞ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jSÞ ¼ 0:3Þg ¼ 0:515
and freqðfS : freqðT jSÞ ¼ 0:3gjfS :: S  R ^ jSj ¼ 10 ^ ðfreqðT jSÞ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jSÞ ¼ 0:3Þg ¼ 0:485.
Step 2: E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:2 0:515þ 0:3 0:485 ¼ 02485.
5 The numerical values are calculated by using the Matlab-code presented in the ‘‘Appendix’’ section.
6 One may think that this fact does change if we move to a higher number for jR0j. Quite the opposite is the
case: If jRj ¼ 1000 and jR0j ¼ 100, and freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:2 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:4, then E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:200.
7 Or if the closest values to freq(T|R) are symmetrical around freq(T|R).
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class. In this case, the closest value to freq(T|R) gets most weight. In many cases it gets
almost all weight. For instance, if freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:5 _ freqðTjR0Þ ¼ 0:7, then
E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:507.8
Of course, many of such examples can be given, but I assume that those given here are
sufficient to show that Thorn’s Method 1 is not correct.
3.4 Diagnosis
The main reason for the fact that Thorn’s Method 1 leads to unreasonable direct inference
probabilities is this: to build the needed expected frequency, Thorn relies on relative
frequencies in arbitrary subsets of the broader reference class. Since, as I show in this
section, the variation of these relative frequencies is very small, the weights pi are extreme.
Suppose that freqðTjRÞ ¼ r, then relative frequencies freq(T|S) in subsets S  R cluster
around r (see ‘‘Appendix’’ section). Surprisingly, however, these relative frequencies are
quite uniform. If the sizes of the sets R and R0 are sufficiently large, then for almost all
subsets S  R, freq(T|S) is very close to r. In other words: The variance of the distribution
of freq(T|S) around its expected value r is small. Figure 1 illustrates this ‘‘concentration’’ or
‘‘peaking’’ property. For a more precise statement see Theorem 1 in the ‘‘Appendix’’
section. Moreover, if the sizes of the sets R and R0 are tending to infinity, then for all [ 0
freqðfS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR0j ^ jr  freqðT jSÞ[ jgÞ is tending to 0. I.e., for almost all
subsets S  R it is the case that jfreqðT jSÞ  freqðT jRÞj is smaller than every fixed number
(think of epsilon as, for instance, 1
1000000000
).9
In Example 1, for instance, the variance of the distribution of freq(T|S) is approximately
0.017. It follows that for 95% of sets S 2 fS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR0jg it holds that
freqðT jSÞ 2 ½0; 0:5. Although this is a reasonable spread around 0.25, it still leads to
problem one, two and four for Thorn’s Method 1 as discussed in Sect. 3.3. Compared to
values that are smaller than 0.5, values for freqðT jR0Þ that are higher than 0.5 get almost no
weight. Worse still, since the variance of the relevant distribution is tending to zero as the
sizes of R and R0 become larger, this tendency magnifies. This ‘‘peaking’’ around the
expected value is responsible for the third problem for Thorn’s Method 1 as discussed in
Sect. 3.3. For instance, if jRj ¼ 1000 and jR0j ¼ 100 in Thorn’s example, then the variance
is approximately 0.002. It follows that for 95% of sets S 2 fS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR0jg it holds
that freqðT jSÞ 2 ½0:17; 0:33.
I conclude that to determine the probabilities pi, Thorn uses a distribution with very low
variance. The resulting direct inference probabilities are therefore extreme. To improve
Thorn’s approach, there are two (not mutually exclusive) options. First, one may consider
special subsets of the broader reference class. The resulting distribution may then have
sufficiently high variance. In Sect. 4.1, I propose such a special class of subsets. Second, to
obtain more balanced probabilities, one may combine the distribution obtained from
considering subsets of the broader reference class with a second distribution. Indeed, that
the weights pi are solely determined by the distribution of subsets of the broader reference
class is a second cause for the failure of Thorn’s Method 1. Thorn ignores the fact that in
most cases there has been evidence that establishes which values are epistemically possible
for the narrower reference class. There has to be data or other evidence for the fact that, for
8 This fact does not change if we move to higher numbers for |R|. Quite the opposite is the case: If
jRj ¼ 1000 and jR0j ¼ 100, and freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:3 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:4, then E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:300.
9 The reason for this is that k occurs in the denominator of the variance of the distribution of freq(T|S) (see
Theorem 1 in the ‘‘Appendix’’ section).
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instance, freqðTjR0Þ ¼ 0:5 _ freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:7. If this evidence is quite good, then accurate
weights should be less sensitive to the distribution of subsets of the broader reference class.
In Sect. 4.2, I propose a Bayesian way to combine the probabilities obtained from the
distribution of subsets of the broader reference class with probabilities obtained form data
on the narrower reference class.
3.5 The Case of No Information Concerning the Narrower Reference Class
Suppose that no information about the frequency in the narrower reference class is
available. To determine the direct inference probability in this case, Thorn applies Method
1 to the logical truth freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0jR0j _ freqðT jR














To determine PROBðfreqðT jR0Þ ¼ ijR0jÞ, Thorn applies Step 1 of Method 1. Method 2 then
yields the following result (Thorn 2016),
If freqðTjRÞ ¼ r and R0  R, then E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ r.
I agree that the conclusion E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ r is reasonable in such cases.10 However, I
think that the reasoning leading to this conclusion is faulty. To determine
E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ r, the set of all subsets of the broader reference class is the wrong (meta)
Fig. 1 Plot of f : f0; . . .; jRjg ! ½0; 1; f ðsÞ :¼ PROBðXFreq ¼ sÞ
10 This is a consistency condition for direct inference: If the direct inference from R0  R, c 2 R0 and
freqðT jRÞ ¼ r, to PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ r should go through and if PROBðc 2 TÞ ¼ E½freqðT jR0Þ, then
E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ r.
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reference class for R0. In Sect. 4.1, I will propose a more suitable (meta) reference class.
However, expected values of two different distributions may agree. By a lucky coincidence
Thorn’s approach yields reasonable direct inference probabilities in this case. In other
cases there is no such luck. Thorn’s approach yields the wrong direct inference proba-
bilities (see Sect. 3.3).
3.6 Pollock’s Approach to Direct Inference
Like Thorn, Pollock motivates his theory of direct inference by considering the distribution
of arbitrary subsets in sets.
Suppose we have a set of 10,000,000 objects. I announce that I am going to select a
subset, and ask you how many members it will have. Most people will protest that
there is no way to answer this question. It could have any number of members from 0
to 10,000,000. However, if you answer, Approximately 5,000,000, you will almost
certainly be right. This is because, although there are subsets of all sizes from 0 to
10,000,000, there are many more subsets whose sizes are approximately 5,000,000
than there are of any other size. In fact, 99% of the subsets have cardinalities
differing from 5,000,000 by less than :08%. (Pollock 2011, p. 329)
Pollock (2011) equates the direct inference probability with what he calls the
expectable value of the narrowest reference class. He calculates the expectable value
within his theory of probable probabilities. These probabilities extrapolate the combina-
torial probabilities for finite sets employed by Thorn to infinite sets. The expectable value
only exists if the variance of the distribution of arbitrary subsets tends to zero as the size of
the broader reference class tends to infinity. In Sect. 4.1, I show that the reasoning
underlying Pollock’s and Thorn’s approach to direct inference is faulty. Considering
arbitrary subsets of sets is not appropriate for determining direct inference probabilities.
Consequently, although they may be accurate in some cases, in general, one cannot trust in
the correctness of Pollock’s direct inference probabilities.
4 Remedy: Natural Distributions
In this section, I propose a new Bayesian solution to the conflict of narrowness and
precision. I argue that the meta direct inference to determine the weights (Step 1 in Thorn’s
Method 1) can be defeated. The set of all subclasses of the broader reference class R that
people actually use in direct inference is a more suitable (meta) reference class for R0 than
the set of arbitrary subsets POWðR; jR0jÞ. The probabilities obtained by this (meta) ref-
erence class yield a natural prior distribution for my Bayesian approach.
4.1 Reference Classes are Exceptional Subsets
Thorn’s Step 1 in Method 1 is based on meta direct inference. To draw the relevant direct
inference, he subsumes R0 under the reference class of all subsets of the broader reference
class R. As I believe in the cogency of direct inference, in order to refute Thorn’s Method
1, the meta direct inference has to be defeated by a narrower or a competing reference class
for R0. Indeed, the set of all reference classes people actually use in direct inference is such
a narrower reference class. Let RefA(T) be the set of all reference classes with respect to the
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target class T that are actually used in direct inference and let
pi ¼ freqðfS : freqðT jSÞ ¼ vigjfS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR
0j ^ freqðT jSÞ 2 V ^ S 2 RefAðTÞgÞ.
Subclass defeat for the meta direct inference to determine the weights
Premise 1: pi ¼ freqðfS : freqðT jSÞ ¼ vigjfS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR
0j ^ freqðT jSÞ 2 VgÞ
Premise 2: R0 2 fS : S  R ^ jSj ¼ jR0j ^ freqðT jSÞ 2 Vg
Premise 3: R0 2 RefAðTÞ
Premise 4: pi 6¼ p

i
Conclusion: PROBðfreqðT jR0Þ ¼ viÞ 6¼ pi
Premise 4 is reasonable. The fact that for almost all subsets S of the broader reference class
R, freq(T|S) is close to freq(T|R) is difficult to reconcile with experience (see also
Wallmann and Williamson 2017). In practice, we often find subsets that contain a rather
different relative frequency of the target class than the original set. For instance, smoking
rates in the United States vary strongly with gender, age, education, poverty status and
many more. But according to the distribution of frequencies of all subsets, such variations
are almost impossible (see Theorem 1 in the ‘‘Appendix’’ section). In other words: Thorn’s
probabilities PROB for frequencies in narrower reference classes do not match our
observed frequencies for frequencies in narrower reference classes, i.e., they are
inaccurate. But why is this the case?
In direct inference we consider certain classes of individuals, because we believe that
they are causally related to the target class. Now, our past success in detecting causally
relevant classes and the fact that almost all subclasses of reference classes are not causally
relevant to the target class, suggest that we are quite successful in detecting ‘‘exceptional’’
subsets. Since they causally interact with the target class, these exceptional classes tend to
be difference makers, i.e., the target class and the reference class tend to be probabilisti-
cally dependent. Therefore, frequencies within sub-reference classes that we actually use in
direct inference do not cluster around a single value. They cluster around multiple values.
Hence, Premise 4 is plausible: The variance among frequencies in sub-reference classes
that we actually use in direct inference is higher than in subsets in general. Therefore, the
new weights pi are more balanced than the pi.
We call distributions that describe how frequencies in sub-reference classes which we
actually use in direct inference are distributed natural distributions (for the concept of
natural distributions in a different context see Paris et al. 2000). We should use natural
distributions in direct inference because they yield the best long-run epistemic conse-
quences in the intended class: The class of all direct inferences that we actually draw. In
absence of further knowledge, the natural distribution maximises expected accuracy in the
class of all direct inferences that we actually draw (see Sect. 3.1).
Granted that the natural distribution is most suitable for direct inference. This fact is of
little help for drawing direct inferences in practice, if there is no way to determine the
natural distribution. How can we find out about the natural distribution? Paris et al. (2000)
discuss two ways to estimate natural distributions in general. First, by empirical experi-
mentation. We could (1) draw a sample of all direct inferences actually drawn such as
freqðT jRÞ ¼ x, (2) study direct inferences in which subclasses S  R were employed, and
finally (3) consider the frequencies freq(T|S) for such S0s. The distribution of these fre-
quencies is then an estimate for the natural distribution. Second, we may propose some
reasonable properties that natural distributions are supposed to have. For instance, we may
assume the default independence E½freqðT jR0Þ ¼ freqðT jRÞ ¼ x.
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A detailed discussion of how to find the natural distribution is beyond the scope of the
present paper, but I think I have said enough to make three crucial points needed here.
First, in building expected frequencies of the narrowest reference classes sub-reference
classes that we actually use in direct inference (rather than arbitrary subclasses of the
broader reference class) should be considered. Second, this natural distribution differs from
Thorn’s distribution. Third, it is possible, at least in principle, to determine the natural
distribution.
4.2 A Bayesian Solution to the Conflict of Narrowness and Precision
On the one hand, in the empirical sciences, frequencies freqðTjR0Þ within reference classes
are in most cases estimated by a suitable statistical procedure from a sample of members of
R0. For instance, suppose that an observed random sample11 (with replacement) of 16 R0-
individuals contains 8 T-individuals. The likelihood for such a sample is
freqðT jR0Þ8  ð1 freqðT jR0ÞÞ8. The likelihood is maximised for freqðTjR0Þ ¼ 0:5. The
likelihood is much smaller if, for instance, freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:1. On the other hand, it should
not be ignored that R0 belongs to the set of all sub-reference classes of R people actually
use. Thus, I reformulate the conflict of narrowness and precision this way.
Conflict of narrowness and precision reformulated How should the following
information be aggregated to get an estimate for the value of freqðT jR0Þ? 1) Fre-
quencies in a sample of the narrower reference class and 2) probabilities obtained
from the natural distribution of sub-reference classes of R.
I propose to assign more weight to estimates based on data than to estimates based on the
fact that the narrower reference class is a sub-reference class of the broader reference class.
Especially, if the probability estimates based on data directly about the narrower reference
and the probability estimate for the broader reference class have almost the same precision,
this is reasonable.
Data over Expectation Principle When determining an estimate for freqðT jR0Þ,
frequencies of the target class in narrower reference classes based on data should get
more weight than probabilities derived from the fact that the narrower reference class
is a sub-reference class of the broader reference class.
To satisfy the Data over Expectation Principle, I propose to use the natural distribution of
sub-reference classes in the broader reference class as prior distribution in a Bayesian
analysis of the data for the narrower reference class. If analysed within Bayesian statistics,
samples of frequencies in narrower reference classes lead to a posterior distribution for
freqðT jR0Þ. Contrary to Kyburg and Teng’s approach to direct inference, not every point in
an interval is treated equally (see Sect. 2).
Let D be a sequence of observations whether certain individuals in the narrower ref-
erence class belong to the target class and lðDjfreqðT jR0Þ ¼ viÞ the likelihood of these
observations given the relative frequency of the target class in R0 is vi. Then
11 A sample is random if and only if in each draw of the sample every member of the population has the same
probability of entering the sample.
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PROBðfreqðTjR0Þ ¼ vijDÞ ¼
1
T
 pi  lðDjfreqðT jR





i  lðDjfreqðT jR
0Þ ¼ viÞ is a normalizing constant.
The direct inference probability is the expected value of the posterior distribution:




0Þ ¼ vijDÞ: ð4Þ
Modulo prior distribution, the posterior distribution accounts for the fact that different
values for freqðT jR0Þ explain that we observe a particular sample to a different degree. In
our example, freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:5 explains the fact that we observed 8 T-individuals much
better than freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:1. Hence, modulo prior probability, the posterior probability of
freqðT jR0Þ ¼ 0:5 is much higher than the posterior probability of freqðTjR0Þ ¼ 0:1.
Bayesian statistics has always been subject to the criticism that the posterior probability is
subjective, because it strongly depends on the prior distribution chosen. However, since it
contains the information of the frequency of the target class in the broader reference class,
the natural distribution of sub-reference classes in the broader reference class is a rea-
sonable prior distribution for freqðT jR0Þ.
Equation (3) captures core intuitions about the conflict of narrowness and precision. The
frequency in the broader reference class will influence the direct inference probability, if
there is only a small sample for the narrower reference class available (this is the case in
which the estimate for the narrower reference class is rather imprecise). As the sample size
increases, the frequency in the broader reference class will loose influence on the direct
inference probability. Again, a Bayesian line of reasoning is not viable in Thorn’s and
Pollock’s approach. The low variance of the distribution for subsets in broader reference
classes will make it almost impossible to update the prior on basis of data directly about the
narrower reference class.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Kyburg and Teng’s approach leads to unreasonable direct inference probabilities. Thorn’s
approach and Pollock’s approach are more promising. However, as my examples in Sect.
3.3 show, Thorn’s Method 1 leads to unreasonable direct inference probabilities. For
instance, if reference classes have sufficiently many members, then it leads to Kyburg and
Teng’s unreasonable Criterion of Precision.
The main reason for this is that Thorn considers arbitrary subsets of the broader ref-
erence class. However, for almost all subsets of the broader reference class it holds that the
frequency of the target class is very close to the frequency of the target class in the broader
reference class. Consequently, the probability distribution employed to build expected
frequencies has too low variance. This point is more general and applies to any approach to
direct inference that is based on combinatorial probabilities. In particular, it applies to
Pollock’s approach to direct inference.
In addition, Thorn’s Method 1 is of limited practical applicability to diagnosis and
prediction in the empirical sciences. It is silent about the case in which a sample of the
target class in the narrower reference class is available. These samples lead to statistical
estimates for relative frequencies of the target class in the narrower reference class.
In response to these two shortcomings, I developed a new Bayesian solution to the
conflict of narrowness and precision that is based on two main assumptions. First, to
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determine expected values, instead of the distribution of frequencies in arbitrary sub-
classes, the natural distribution should be employed, i.e., the distribution of frequencies in
sub-reference classes of the broader reference class that we actually use in direct inference
should be employed. Second, probabilities obtained by the natural distribution need to be
aggregated with estimates for the frequencies of the target class in the narrower reference
class obtained from data. The resulting approach equates the direct inference probability
with the expected value of the posterior distribution in the narrower reference class. A
reasonable prior is given by the natural distribution. However, further research is needed to
determine the relevant natural distribution, i.e., to determine the pi .
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Appendix
Let V andW :¼ fw1; . . .;wng  R be finite sets. Let P be a probability function on V. Then
a function X : V 7!W is called a discrete random variable. The distribution of X is given by









2  PðX ¼ WiÞ:
The following facts are well known in combinatorics (for instance, Larsen and Marx
2012, p.110, p.143, pp.191–192).
Theorem 1 Let jRj ¼ N, jR0j ¼ k and freqðT jRÞ ¼ r.
Then XFreq: POWðR; jR
0jÞ7!fmaxf0; ððjR0j þ rNÞ  NÞg; . . .;minfjR0j; rNgg: XFreqðSÞ ¼
jT ^ Sj is hypergeometrically distributed with parameters N, rN, k. I.e.,















E½jT ^ Sj ¼ r.
The variance of XFreq is krð1 rÞ
Nk
N1. Hence, Var½freqðT jSÞ ¼
1
k2





























  : ð5Þ
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Here is a Matlab-code to calculate Thorn’s expected frequencies:
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